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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Alan N. Resnick*

Balancing Equities to Determine
the RightS' of an Unauthorized
Postpetitlon Secured Lender

Imagine giving a debtor a substantial loan to finance the acquisition
of property-relying on a security
interest in the acquired asset to secure the loan-without knowing thaf
the debtor previously filed a Chapter 11 petition and has been operating as a debtor in possession. After
discovering the debtor's bankruptcy
status, you also learn that the procedural requirements for obtaining
postpetition financing had not been
satisfied and that the bankruptcy
court and creditors' committee were
unaware of the loan transaction.
What ar~ a lender's rights under
these circumstances?
The Ninth Circuit was faced with
a similar situation in In re
McConville. 1 The debtors in that
case·were in the business of dealing
in distressed real estate. On July 8•.

* Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead, N.Y.;
Counsel tq the firm of Fried, Frlmk, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson, New York, N.Y.; Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules of the Judicial Conference of
the United States; member of the National
Bankruptcy Conference. The views- expressed in this article are the author's own.
1
In re McConville, 110 F3d 47 (9th Cir.
1997).

1993-only ope week before they
filed a Chapter 11 petition-the
debtors entered into a contract to
purchase eight apartments located in
a building in Oakland, California.
The seller was the Bayview Federal
'Bank and the total purchase price
was $122,000. The debtors paid a
nonrefundable $10,000 down payment a11d the closing was set to take
place within thirty days after the con· tract signing. On July 14, 1993, the
debtors filed a Chapter 11 petition.
Financing the Transaction
Although the debtors were counting on funding from Robert Kamp
so thl}t th~y cpuld complete the pur:~hase of the property, Kamp was
unable to provide the funds by the
closing date. The debtors then paid
the seller an additional $5,000, also
nonrefundable, in exchange for a
short extension of the closing date~
to August 13.
David Margen and Lawton Associates, as lenders, agreed to give the
debtors a $107,000 short-term
bridge loan to tide them over .until
Kamp came through with his funding. According to the court of appeals, these bridge lenders believed
that the property was worth more
than $122,000 and "were told by
Kamp that the Debtors' credit was
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good and that he_ was looking for lien created by the deed of trust, alother opportunities to lend to the leging that it was an unauthorized,
Debtors."2 The court also pointed out po,stpetition transfer of property of
that there was no evidence that the the bankruptcy estate that may be
debtors informed the seller, the avoided under Section 549(a) of the
bridge lenders, or Kamp that they Bankruptcy_ Code.
had filed a Chapter 11 petition. The
Section 549(a) gives the trustee
court also found that the bridge lend- · the power to avoid, with certain exers did not require a loan statement ceptions, any transfer of property of
from the debtors and received no the bankruptcy estate that occurs afrepresentation as to their assets and ter the filing of the bankruptcy petiliabilities.
tion if the transfer is not authorized
On August 12, the debtors ex- by the Code or by the bankruptcy
ecuted a thirty-day promissory note court. An important exception to the
payable to the bridge lenders, and a avoidance power in Section 549(a)
deed of trust on the ~eal estate that is in Section 549(c), which protects
was being acquired. The note was for a good faith purchaser of real propthe principal amount of $107,000 erty who has no knowledge of the
with interest at the rate of 12 per- bankruptcy case and who pays fair
cent. The bridge lenders kept equivalent value for th~ property
$10,000 of the loan proceeds as a unless, before the transfer, a copy or
fee, and the remaining $97,000 was notice of the bankruptcy petition was
used to purchase the property the filed in the office where the real esnext day. The deed of trust was duly tate transfer would be recorded. The
recorded on August 13. All of this purpose of this provision is to prowas done while the bridge lenders tect a buyer who was unaware of the
were unaware that the debtors were seller's bankruptcy case and who
in Chapter 11.
could not have detected the bankOne month after the execution of ruptcy filing by checking in the apthe note and recording of the deed propriate real estate recording office
of trust, the Chapter 11 case was at the time of the transaction. If the
converted to a Chapter ?liquidation good faith purchaser has paid less than
and a trustee was appointed. The fair equivalent value, Section 549(c)
bridge lenders moved for relief from provides that the purchaser is given a
the automatic stay so they could lien on the property transferred to the
foreclose on the real estate, but the extent of any present value paid for
bankruptcy court denied the motion. 3 the property.
. The trustee then commenced an adversary proceeding against the
Bankruptcy Court Voids the
bridge lenders seeking to void the
Unauthorized Lien
2

Id. at 49.

3

See 11 USC§ 362.

In determining whether the trustee
could avoid the lien in McConville,
179
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the bankruptcy court held that (1)
although they were purchasers in
good faith, the bridge lenders nonetheless violated the automatic stay
under Section 362(a)(4)4 by recording the deed of trust; (2) the transfer
was not within the scope of the exception for good faith purchasers
under Section 549(c); and (3) the
debtors had acted in violation of
Section 364 of the Code, which sets
forth the requirements for obtaining
postpetition credit. The bankruptcy
court, based on this reasoning, entered a judgment in favor of the
trustee, declaring that the bridge lenders had no lien against the proceeds
from the sale of the real estate.
The district court affirmed the
bankruptcy court's decision, holding
that a lender that had acquired a lien
on real property was not a "purchaser" within the meaning of Section 549(c). Because the bridge
lenders were not "purchasers" within
the meaning of Section 549(c), they
could not be treated as good faith
purchasers of real estate.
The bridge lenders appealed to the
Ninth Circuit, where both parties
originally focused their arguments
on thef application of Section 549.
The trustee argued that the lien was
a "transfer" of property of the estate
for the purpose of applying Section
549(a), so that it may be avoided
under that section. The bridge lenders, however, argued that the excep4
See 11 USC § 362(a)(4), which automatically stays "any act to create, perfect,
or enforce any lien against property of the
estate."
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tion under Section 549(c) was applicable to protect them.
The court of appeals rejected both
arguments based on binding decisions in the Ninth Circuit "which
simply hold that the creation of a lien
does not transfer property for purposes of Section 549."5 The court
indicated that the only way for it to
change this precedent was to call for
an en bane hearing, which it was not
prepared to do because it found another way to resolve the case.
The court of appeals determined
that Section 364(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provided a basis for
avoiding the lien of the bridge lenders. Under that provision, if the
trustee is unable to obtain post-petition unsecured credit allowable as an
administrative expense, 6 the court,
after notice and a hearing, may authorize the obtaining of credit secured by a lien on unencumbered
property of the estate. Although Section 364 speaks to the rights of a
trustee to obtain credit, it is applicable to a debtor in possession by
reason of Section 1107(a).7 The court
noted that Section 364 was applicable to the debtors in McConville
and that, before the appointment of
the trustee in the converted case, the
debtors "were fiduciaries of their
own estate owing a duty of care and

s Supra note 1 at 49. The court cited In re
Schwartz, 954 F2d 569 (9th Cir. 1992), and
In re Shamblin, 890 F2d 123 (9th Cir. 1989).
6
See 11 USC§ 503(b)(l).
7 See 11 USC§ 1107(a), which, with
few exceptions, gives a debtor-in-possession
the rights and powers of a trustee.
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loyalty to the estate's creditors."8
The debtors did not satisfy the requirements of Section 364(c)(2) in
that they did not obtain court approval for the secured financing·
transaction.
The next task for the court of appeals was to determine the appropriate remedy or resolution of the
proceeding.
An appropriate remedy for this disregard [of§ 364(c)(2)] is cancellation
by the court of the transaction. It is
disruptive of bankruptcy for an estate
to obtain fresh credit without regard
to the court now supervising the estate. It is within the power of that
court to rescind the contract unlawfully made. 9

unjust result for an innocent party
who dealt with a debtor without
knowing that the debtor was in bankruptcy. Justice William 0. Douglas,
referring to the former Bankruptcy
Act, wrote that "we do not read these
statutory words with the ease of a
computer. There is an overriding
consideration that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction." 12
The cdurt then went on to identify
the equities in McConv,ille.
The equities here are these: On the
one hand, as the Lenders have not
ceased to remind us, their loan enabled the Debtors to carry out their
contract and so obtain the property for
the estate. Moreover, the Trustee
stipulated that the Lenders were in
good faith, so that the question of their
knowledge of the Debtors' actual
bankruptcy was removed from the
case. On the other hand, the Lenders
had to know that the Debtors' position was precarious. The Debtors' inability to obtain the loan they'd
counted on, the absence of any effort
to get bank financing, and the total
amount paid for the loan signalled
their situation. In addition, the Lenders' failure to ask for any representation of the Debtors' financial condition amounted to pretty much willful
blindness. The Lenders' lack of
knowledge of the Debtors' bankruptcy was not unavoidable." 13

Balancing t~e Equities
But the court of appeals did not
automatically rescind the transaction
in McConville. Rather, it recognized
that "[t]he exercise of this corrective
power ... should not occur without
regard to the equities of the situation, for, within the limits set by the
code, a bankruptcy court must do
equity." 10 In emphasizing the need
to focus on the equities of the particular case, the court of appeals
cited the famous decision in Bank of
Marin v. England. 11 In that case, the
Supreme Court declined to apply the
former Bankruptcy Act literally
when to do so would have led to an
8

Supra note 1 at 50.

Based on these circumstances, the
court of appeals held that it would
be equitable for the bridge lenders
to get back the amount that they had
lent, less the amount that they had

9

ld.
10 ld.
11
Bank of Marin v. England, 385 US 99

(1966).

12

13
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already been paid. In essence, the
lenders should receive no benefit
from their loan-no fees and no interest-but should be restored to the
position they were in when they ex-
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tended the credit. Jn this case, the
court held that the bridge lenders
were entitled to a lien on $97,000 of
the proceeds from the sale of the
property.
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